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Abstract 
In this paper I argue against the theory – popular among theorists of narrative artworks – 
that we must posit a fictional narrative agent in every narrative artwork in order to 
explain our imaginative engagement with such works. I accept that every narrative must 
have a narrator, but I argue that in some central literary cases the narrator is not a 
fictional agent, but rather the actual author of the work. My criticisms focus on the 
strongest argument for the ubiquity of fictional narrators, Jerrold Levinson’s ontological-




Against the Ubiquity of Fictional Narrators 
A large group of artworks can be usefully classified as narratives. These are works that 
tell stories. It is a far from easy task to set down criteria for membership in this genus, 
and I shall not be attempting that here.1 Rather, taking the genus of narrative artworks for 
granted, I will investigate one species: narrative literature. A number of recent theorists – 
most notably Seymour Chatman, Jerrold Levinson, and George Wilson – have argued 
that there is necessarily a fictional narrator in every narrative, a conclusion I call the 
“ubiquity thesis.” I shall argue that the ubiquity thesis is mistaken, since certain 
paradigmatic novels and stories have no narrator in the sense these theorists employ.2 
Though I limit my discussion here to literary narratives, what I propose could be adapted 
for other species of narrative, a point I return to at the end of the paper. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE FICTIONAL NARRATOR 
Before we investigate whether or not novels invariably have narrators, we should 
establish the nature of the snark we are hunting. I shall be disputing the ubiquity of a 
narrator understood as possessing just two essential features. The first is agency. 
Chatman, Levinson, and Wilson all point out that narration is an activity, something that 
gets done, and as such implies an agent. But their strongest motivation behind specifying 
“agency” as a feature of narrators is that it is a broader term than “humanity.” It is easy to 
point out that if novels have narrators, they often know more than, and have powers 
greater than, any human could. Thus, a ubiquity theorist must insist from the start that 
“human personality is not a sine qua non for narratorhood.”3 
The second distinguishing feature these narrators have is fictionality. That is, 
these theorists claim that each novel’s narrator is on the same ontological level as its 
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characters and events. Again, they are at pains to point out that the claim is not that the 
narrator is a character in the traditional sense (though this may be the case – for example, 
in most novels narrated in the first person), merely that it is not to be posited at the level 
of actuality, but rather at the fictional level.4 
Let me also make clear that I do not deny the existence of fictional narrators. 
They most obviously exist in first-person narrated novels. Indeed, it may be that most 
novels have fictional narrators. But I will argue that a certain central kind of novel has no 
fictional narrator, and that the ubiquity thesis is thus false. My strategy will be to 
investigate the main arguments for the ubiquity of fictional narrators in novels. I make 
use of several observations that George Wilson makes in “Le Grand Imagier Steps Out”5; 
oddly enough, Wilson is there a ubiquity theorist, yet I believe his criticisms point 
towards a more restricted role for fictional narrators, one which he is simply unwilling 
ultimately to accept. 
II. THE ANALYTIC ARGUMENT 
We have already touched on the first argument for the ubiquity of fictional narrators – 
what I call the “Analytic Argument.” The authority to look to here is Chatman. He argues 
that every narrative is by definition narrated – that is, narratively presented – 
and that narration, narrative presentation, entails an agent even when the 
agent bears no signs of human personality. Agency is marked etymologically 
by the -er/-or suffix attached to the verbs “present” or “narrate.” The suffix 
means either “agent” or “instrument,” and neither need be human....The 
notion of “non-narrated” narrative arises as a misguided effort to restrict 
“agency” to human beings, but the restriction will not hold.6 
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Wilson and Levinson both cite parts of this passage,7 and Levinson offers his own 
formulation: “[I]f narration means anything, it is the conveying or imparting of a story by 
means [i.e. media] that are distinct both from the story being conveyed and from that 
which is doing the conveying [i.e. the narrative agent]...”8 
I believe this argument is sound. The only way I can imagine attacking it would 
be to claim that narration is something like biological growth – an event or process, but 
not an action, therefore implying no agent. I find this suggestion untenable. Stories do not 
simply appear out of thin air; they do not occur naturally, independently of human 
agency, as the growth of trees does.9 Paisley Livingston has argued that it may be 
indeterminate whether or not any given narrative has a narrator.10 But I cannot 
countenance this either. It is a simple conceptual point that stories must be told in some 
way by some thing. 
However, we should note that the conclusion of the Analytic Argument is fairly 
weak. All it says is that there is an agent who is responsible for the narrative. This is 
compatible with the view that there are no fictional narrators. For authors would seem to 
be prima facie candidates for the agents responsible for their narratives. They do things 
that result in the stories we read. So the ubiquity theorist needs more to establish even the 
existence of fictional narrators, let alone their ubiquity. 
III. THE ONTOLOGICAL-GAP ARGUMENT 
Jerrold Levinson has provided the strongest argument that in order to make sense of our 
engagement with fictions, in addition to the author we need to posit a narrator at the 
fictional level. Though Levinson focuses on narrative film, it is clear that he would 
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extend his argument to narrative literature. The argument has two main stages, and is 
founded on questions about how it is we come to know what is fictional in a work. 
The first is a positive stage – it seeks to establish something. Levinson argues that 
we can reasonably expect an answer to how it is we are being given information about the 
world of the fiction we are reading or viewing. And the obvious answer is that someone 
is presenting it to us: 
Reason – albeit reason operating in service of the imaginative understanding 
of fiction – demands an answer to how it is that a world is being made visible 
to us, and that demand, it appears, is only satisfied by the assumption of an 
agency responsible for that.11 
The notion of a presenter, whose main charge is the providing of perceptual 
access on the fictional world, is simply the best default assumption available 
for how we make sense of narrative fiction film.12 
At first this may not seem to establish anything more than the Analytic Argument did. 
But, as these quotations make clear, the Ontological-Gap Argument goes beyond the 
Analytic Argument by restricting the class of narratives being discussed to fictional 
narratives. Hence, the real bite of this argument comes at the second stage. 
The second stage is negative – it seeks to deny that an agent who gives us 
epistemic access to a fictional world can coherently be considered to occupy a different 
ontological level from that world. The basic idea is that if the narrative agent were 
outside the fictional world – at our ontological level, say – it could not coherently present 
us with the story events and characters as if they were real, that is, on its own ontological 
level. Hence the narrator must be fictional, and thus cannot be the author (or filmmaker). 
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A narrator and the events narrated by the narrator must be on the same 
fictional plane, otherwise cognitive relations posited between narrator and 
events would not make sense....The implied filmmaker can’t be in the 
position of directly affording us – as with a silent gesture of “behold!” – the 
vision and audition of something that is only fictional with respect to himself, 
namely, the characters and their circumstances; that remains the prerogative 
of the film’s narrator or presenter, who is, in a fundamental sense...“one of 
them.”13 
There are problems with both stages of this argument, and I will address them in turn. 
IV. THE POSITIVE STAGE 
George Wilson makes some telling observations about the coherence of the foundations 
of fictions which should give us pause when considering Levinson’s claim that we can 
reasonably expect answers to questions about our epistemic access to fictional worlds. 
Wilson points out that there may be paradoxes or incoherencies at the very base of 
fictional works. For instance, a novel may represent itself as a copy of a diary that must 
have been destroyed in the story-culminating fire.14 More commonly, it is indeterminate 
whether the narrator is supposed to be thinking the words we are reading, speaking them 
aloud, or has written them down, and in any case, how we are supposed to have gotten 
hold of a transcription or copy.15 The nicest example is provided by David Hills: “The 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn...represents itself as a carefully crafted 300 page memoir 
by its title character, a barely literate young man getting ready to set out for the territories 
because the prospect of any work that requires him to sit still terrifies him.”16 In sum: 
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[T]he reader imagines reading a transcription of the narrator’s own utterances 
or inscriptions, but her imagination does not specify anything about what 
makes it possible for her to do this. Fictionally, it is indeterminate how the 
reader can be acquainted, as she is, with the product of the narrator’s 
storytelling performance.17 
Now, the point of marshalling these observations here is to repel Levinson’s first 
sally. If reason does not demand an answer to how we come to see or know about the 
fictional world, then the one that Levinson provides – namely, that there is a fictional 
narrator – is simply otiose. Of course, that will not be a very powerful rejoinder if the 
second stage of Levinson’s argument leads to a successful theory. If a theory explains 
something, we do not need any extra motivation to adopt it. I will get to the adequacy of 
the second stage soon, but there is yet another problem Wilson’s points raise for the first 
stage. 
Suppose reason did demand an answer to the question of how we have access to 
the fictional world. And suppose we answered: “By means of a fictional narrative agent.” 
What leads Levinson to believe that reason will be satisfied with that? Surely there are 
further questions to be asked, such as what sort of agent this is, how it knows so much 
about the world, and how it imparts this information to us? It seems odd to suppose that 
reason could take this first step on to the slippery slope of fiction-foundational questions 
by asking how we come to know about the fictional world, and then get a satisfactory 
grip with such a tenuous answer – that there is some fictional narrative agent – thus 
managing to resist sliding any further. This problem is even more glaring in Chatman’s 
exposition. Immediately after an extended argument that reason demands an explanation 
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of how we are presented with this story, and that a fictional narrator is the only 
possibility, he goes on to say that “[h]ow the narrator came to ‘know’ the provided 
information seems a nonquestion.”18 This is a curiously sudden loss of interest. 
However, even if we grant Levinson the first stage of his argument, the second 
stage is untenable. I turn again to Wilson for my cue. He makes a simple but crucial 
distinction between actual telling and fictional telling. The End of the Road (1958) is 
John Barth’s second novel. It is a first-person narrative by the main character, Jacob 
Horner. We can thus distinguish between the actual telling of the fictional story, which 
John Barth engages in, and the fictional telling of the story engaged in by Horner. 
Wilson’s observation is that each of these tellings, by the Analytic Argument, entails a 
teller. But he points out that only the fictional telling implies a fictional teller (just as a 
fictional shooting, say, implies only a fictional gunman). The actual telling of the story 
implies only an actual teller. 
Now, it so happens that Horner is, in Gregory Currie’s terminology,19 a 
controlling narrator: it is fictional that he produces a text identical to the one we have 
before us. It also happens that The End of the Road is the most coherently founded fiction 
I know.20 The text implies that Horner has produced it as Scriptotherapy – a part of his 
ongoing treatment at the Remobilization Farm. Unlike so many well-founded fictions, 
this explains not only the existence of this text in the fictional world, but also its literary 
qualities.21 But neither of these points is essential. David Copperfield (1849-50, Wilson’s 
example) is a first person narrative by the eponymous main character, but it seems 
unlikely that Copperfield is a controlling narrator, and hence the fiction is ill-founded (or 
at least indeterminately founded). But clearly there are still two tellings here: Dickens’s 
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actual telling of the fictional story and Copperfield’s fictional telling of his life-story. 
There are plenty of problematic cases also. It is not clear that we can take the belatedly 
intrusive first-person narrator in John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman to be the 
actual John Fowles (as the narrator tries to imply, at least on one level), or whether he is 
rather another fictional entity. 
However, I would argue that there are also clear cases where there is no fictional 
telling. Graham Greene often writes in a plain third-person omniscient narrative style. In 
The Heart of the Matter (1948) he tells the pathetically tragic tale of Scobie, and I see no 
reason to suppose that anyone else does. Of course, there are various embedded narrators 
in the novel – most of the characters tell stories about their lives, as in most novels – but 
there seems to be no reason to posit any overarching narrator other than Greene.22 The 
book as a whole, unlike David Copperfield or The End of the Road, is simply not 
fictionally narrated. 
V. THE NEGATIVE STAGE 
At this point Levinson might fairly point out that I can claim all I want, but a claim is not 
a response. The second stage of his argument was precisely meant to show that though at 
first glance it might seem that actual authors narrate their novels, this is incoherent, 
because they cannot make the assertions about the fictional world that are clearly being 
made. Someone at the beginning of The Heart of the Matter claims that “Wilson sat on 
the balcony of the Bedford Hotel with his bald pink knees thrust against the ironwork.”23 
Graham Greene is clearly not asserting this; he of all people should know that neither 
Wilson nor the Bedford Hotel exists. Indeed, four pages earlier, he has told us explicitly 
that “[n]o character in this book is based on that of a living person.”24 Anyone prepared 
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to make the assertion about Wilson and the Bedford must be at the fictional level, and 
Graham Greene is simply not. The simplest hypothesis we can make is that there is a 
fictional narrator who offers us these facts about the fictional world. 
There are two ways of responding to this second stage of the argument. First, one 
can emphasize the continuity of Greene-style fictions with other fictional narratives 
where we do not infer a fictional narrator. Traditionally, the oral storyteller is given as an 
example. To bring things a little closer to home, consider telling a joke. Here you begin 
to tell an audience about an American, an Australian, and a New Zealander; but only the 
most churlish listeners ask for more details about them, or how you know them, or why 
we should trust what you say.25 Anyone who knows about joke-telling knows that these 
people do not really exist, that one should merely imagine that the events related 
occurred. An improvised (third-person omniscient) bedtime story is even closer to the 
case of the Greene novel. Indeed, I cannot see any relevant difference in kind between the 
bedtime story transcribed and the Greene novel. We know that the novel is “just” a story; 
we know we are only supposed to imagine these events’ having occurred, not to believe 
they actually did, let alone that Greene believes they did. 
Of course, it is not just Graham Greene who writes in this ‘transparent’ style, but 
he is an ideal example.26 Other commonly suggested candidates for exemplars of the 
style are Ernest Hemingway, and nineteenth-century English novelists. I believe the latter 
are much less simple and unproblematic than they are usually taken to be. There are often 
surprising interjections in the first person by narrators of indeterminate ontological level, 
or incoherent attempts at founding the fiction. I shy away from Hemingway as my 
example because somehow his prose retains a forceful personal style despite his complete 
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narratorial self-effacement. Though none of this shows that there are fictional narrators in 
all nineteenth-century fiction, or Hemingway’s works, it militates against using those 
works as rhetorically persuasive paradigmatic examples. Greene seems the ideal 
transparent stylist. 
There is a second way to criticize the second stage of the Ontological-Gap 
Argument. This is to point out that it has internal tensions that ultimately undermine it. 
The second stage is based on the idea that the artist cannot present the fictional world to 
us, because she does not stand in the right relation to it – the two are on different 
ontological levels. This problem is solved by positing an agent at the fictional level, who 
thereby does stand in the right epistemic relation to the fictional world. But it is not clear 
that this is a solution to the problem Levinson sets up. The problem is that we have a 
bunch of things at the level of the real world – the artist and the audience, for instance – 
and a bunch of things at the ontological level of the fiction – the characters and events of 
the story – and there is no bridge from the latter to the former, no way for the fictional to 
be presented to the real. The proposed solution is to add one more entity to the fictional 
world: a narrator. But how does this help us? If we could not simply look and see the 
fictional world, how is one more fictional entity supposed to change that? Another way to 
see the problem is to ask: If we cannot understand how the artist can reach down and 
show us the fictional world, how is it that the fictional narrator can reach up and show it 
to us? In fact, if we must choose between these alternatives, surely it makes more sense to 
accept the former. Clearly fictions are in some sense part of our world – we really do 
interact with them – so we should be able to have some sort of access to them. But it is 
not clear that the real world is part of every fictional world – certainly not in the same 
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way – so it is not obvious that a fictional entity could have any intentional relation to a 
real entity, as presentation, or telling, implies. Thus it makes more sense to suppose a real 
agent could show the fictional to us than to suppose a fictional agent could. 
A ubiquity theorist might try to respond to this apparent inconsistency in a 
number of ways. She might suggest that the narrator just presents the fictional world in a 
certain way, but not to us. We just happen to be in the right place at the right time and see 
what it is presenting. Or perhaps the narrator presents it to other unspecified fictional 
entities, and we look over their shoulders, unbeknownst to them. 
But apart from specific worries about these particular suggestions – such as the 
coherence of the idea of a presentation to no one, and the epicyclic multiplication of 
fictional entities – they miss the main point of the objection. Unless the narrator has some 
sort of ontological dual-citizenship in the real and fictional worlds, there is still an 
ontological gap between us and the fictional world. Now, one might ask what the 
problem with such a gap is. And, indeed, I don’t have one.27 But this avenue is not open 
to the ubiquity-theorist. If the ontological gap between the real and fictional worlds is not 
a problem, this strategy can’t get off the ground. For without a problem, there is no need 
to posit another entity – a fictional narrator – to explain our access to Greene-style 
fictions. 
 Jerrold Levinson has responded to my criticisms of the Ontological-Gap 
Argument.28 He claims as common ground between us that John Barth and Charles 
Dickens “wrote texts which, when imaginatively engaged with in the prescribed way, 
convey stories, and that fictionally Jacob Horner and David Copperfield are telling us 
their stories,” but he denies that this licenses the conclusion that “Barth and Dickens are 
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telling fictional stories.”29 But if John Barth and Charles Dickens do not tell fictional 
stories, who does? On Levinson’s view, no one ever tells fictional stories (that is, no 
actual person). 
Levinson does restrict his view to straightforward “reported” fictional narratives, 
avoiding the special problems of postmodern and other “storytelling” fictions (see §VI, 
below), so there is a position in logical space where one would allow that (only) the 
postmodernists and their ilk tell fictional stories. But, again, note the oddity of this 
conclusion. Postmodernists are supposed to be notorious for having rejected storytelling 
wherever possible. I maintain that writing a text that, when imaginatively engaged with in 
the manner prescribed by our fictional practices, conveys a story, just is one way among 
many of telling a story. 
VI. A MINIMAL THEORY AND SOME CONSEQUENCES30 
I have acknowledged that there are two ontological levels involved in our engagement 
with fiction, that we are on a different one from the characters and events of the fiction, 
and yet that we come to know about the fictional world. How can I claim there is no 
problem here? The answer is simply that though there are two ontological levels, there is 
no relevant ontological or epistemological gap. It seems to me that we learn about a 
fictional world from the person who invented it – the artist – through the medium of the 
artwork. Concerns about how we have access to fictional worlds seem to me closely 
analogous to the problems about how we have access to possible worlds that Kripke was 
at such pains to dissolve.31 A fictional world is not like a distant planet that we need some 
magical telescope to find out about. Its nature is just as stipulated as that of any possible 
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world we might propose.32 It is stipulated by the artist through the work. So to learn 
about it, we engage with the work. 
As Wilson points out, if there is a fictional narrator it is usually pretty obvious 
from the work.33 If the story is told in the first person, ostensibly by someone with a 
different name from the author’s, and it is sold as a novel, we have many good reasons to 
suppose that within this fiction being told there is also a fictional telling by a fictional 
agent. Sometimes the signs are much more subtle, as in the popular example of Henry 
James’s “The Liar.” But sometimes we have simply no reason to suppose there is a 
fictional telling of the story we read or see. In The Heart of the Matter, Graham Greene 
spins a good yarn, but there is no reason to posit an overarching fictional telling within it 
or co-extensive with it. 
One advantage of my theory is that it can deal with all literary fictions, although 
one has to look at each case individually. Of the ubiquity theorists, only Levinson points 
out that the theory may not be able to handle “storytelling narrators” in Walton’s 
terminology – narrators who clearly signal the fictionality of the story they are 
presenting.34 The two examples Levinson gives are William Makepeace Thackeray’s 
Vanity Fair (1847-8) and John Fowles’s The French Lieutenant’s Woman (1969). My  
view is that Thackeray is indeed narrating Vanity Fair, just much less self-effacingly than 
a Graham Greene, while Fowles’s narrator-as-impresario is too tricky to allow us to 
identify him unproblematically with the author.35 
But whether or not you agree with my individual interpretations, ultimately our 
decision about whether there is a fictional narrator will be part of our intentional 
explanation of any given artwork.36 Both Vanity Fair and The End of the Road have 
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inconsistent chronologies. Yet we believe only the latter has an unreliable narrator, in the 
usual sinister sense. Why? Because part of any complete understanding of The End of the 
Road must take account of the deliberate concealment of the inconsistent time-structure; 
it cries out for explanation. But the temporal inconsistencies in Vanity Fair, while even 
greater, seem merely to be errors – a function of the book’s serial production. Nothing of 
interest to an understanding of Vanity Fair comes from a close investigation of the 
confusion of its temporal structure.37 Similarly, whether we posit a fictional narrator in 
The Heart of the Matter or “The Liar” is a question of what it would buy us in terms of 
understanding these works. If I understand these works correctly, the supposition of a 
fictional narrator in The Heart of the Matter would get us no further than the intuitive 
understanding that Greene himself is telling the tale. On the other hand, the supposition 
of a fictional narrator in “The Liar” makes sense of its boss-eyed view of the action, and 
gives rise to further interesting critical questions. 
We can also use this general point to criticize some other narratological theories. 
Gregory Currie, for instance, argues that we can eliminate external narrators, putting 
(implied) authors in their place. Now, it is not entirely clear what he means by an 
“external” narrator, but he is discussing cases of unreliability like James’s “The Liar.” 
Thus an external narrator seems to be the kind of narrator the ubiquity thesis posits – an 
agent at the fictional level, but not a character involved in the action. Currie claims we 
can do without these posits, explaining away this sort of unreliability as ironic narration 
by the implied author. 
This seems a procrustean solution to me. Unreliable narrators do not usually seem 
ironic. They often seem sinister or treacherous in their underhand subversion of the role 
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of the omniscient narrator. Moreover, there seems to be no good reason to do away with 
unreliable fictional narrators. Unless we have independent reason to suppose that all 
narratives are narrated in the same way, by the same type of agent, there is no need to get 
rid of all fictional narrators. Let us introduce them where we need them, but only where 
we need them. 
At this point, a ubiquity theorist might criticize my minimal theory by pointing to 
a possible parallel between hypothetical intentionalism and the ubiquity thesis. 
Hypothetical intentionalists argue that we should keep the hypothetical and actual authors 
separate in our theory even when the author’s actual intentions agree with an ideal 
hypothesis about them. Similarly, mightn’t one argue that we should always give both the 
actual and the fictional narrator a place in our theory, even though in some cases (for 
example Greene-style fictions and most films) there seems to be no difference between 
the authorial and fictional narration?38 
We should not. Hypothetical intentionalism is a theory about how we properly go 
about interpreting works of art. If it is the right theory, we can appeal to it in disputing the 
meanings of individual works, but whether it is the right theory is a meta-question. The 
question of whether there is an overarching narrator at the fictional level is rather a 
question of the content of a work of art – that is, it is an interpretive question. I see no 
prima facie reason why we should suppose there is a general answer to it for all 
narratives, any more than we should suppose all narratives have a particular time-
structure. Of course, there may be secunda facie reasons, so to speak, but I have shown 
that those thus far suggested are unsound. 
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I have argued, then, that the best account of our engagement with literary 
narratives does not entail our always positing a fictional narrator – an agency at the 
fictional level that is credited with presenting the fictional world to us. Of course, since 
these are stories, there must be someone telling them, but unless there is some particular 
reason for thinking otherwise, I see no problem with the intuitive view that the person 
telling the story is the one who made it up – the author. 
I will end by mentioning two areas about which my minimal theory invites further 
thought. One is the extension of my theory to other forms of narrative art, particularly 
film. Due to the collaborative nature of film production, it is contentious whether there is 
a single actual ‘author’ who could be thought to ‘tell the story’ of the film. But it might 
be that the most important component of my theory is that an entity at the actual rather 
than the fictional level is responsible for the telling of some tales. This might be 
consistent with a view that implied, rather than actual authors are the narrators of certain 
works. Another area my minimal theory may have implications for is theory of 
interpretation. Some theorists argue that any consideration of the actual artist in engaging 
with a work is inappropriate. But such consideration may be unavoidable if artists are 




1 For a helpful introduction to the problem, see Paisley Livingston, “Narrative,” in The 
Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, ed. Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (London: 
Routledge, 2001), pp. 275-84. 
2 I will make this sense explicit in the next section, but let me say here that by “narrator” 
simpliciter I mean to cover all the variants such as “show-er,” “teller,” “presenter,” and 
“perceptual enabler” introduced by various theorists in order not to prejudice the 
discussion in favor of the literary narrator. 
3 Seymour Chatman, Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 115. Both Wilson and Levinson  quote 
an alternative formulation from the same page. See George M. Wilson, “Le Grand 
Imagier Steps Out: The Primitive Basis of Film Narration,” Philosophical Topics 25 
(1997): 296, and Jerrold Levinson, “Film Music and Narrative Agency,” in Post-Theory: 
Reconstructing Film Studies, ed. David Bordwell and Noël Carroll (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1996), p. 251. 
4 I shall use the third person neuter pronoun to refer to a narrator in this technical sense, 
as this seems to fit these theorists’ “pure agency” view best. 
5 George M. Wilson, “Le Grand Imagier Steps Out: The Primitive Basis of Film 
Narration,” Philosophical Topics 25 (1997): 295-318. In his earlier work, Wilson was 
more circumspect about the existence of  fictional narrators. See George M. Wilson, 
Narration in Light: Studies in Cinematic Point of View (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1986), pp. 126-44. Thomas Wartenburg has suggested, in private 




Wilson equivocates on the matter, as a result of accepting the Analytic Argument earlier 
in his paper but not considering its implications for the theory he develops later (the 
“Mediated Version of the Fictional Showing Hypothesis”). But I believe the most 
charitable coherent reading of the paper implicates him as a ubiquity theorist. 
6 Chatman, Coming to Terms, pp. 115-6. 
7 Wilson, “Le Grand Imagier,” pp. 296-7; Levinson, “Film Music and Narrative 
Agency,” pp. 251-3. 
8 Levinson, “Film Music and Narrative Agency,” p. 250. 
9 I do not mean to beg the question of the humanity of narrative agency here. Even 
ubiquity theorists agree that human agency must be part of the theory somewhere (say, at 
the level of authorship). 
10 Paisley Livingston, “Narration, Narrators, and Fictional Presentations: A Minimalist 
Position,” American Society for Aesthetics, Eastern Division Meeting, Baltimore, MD 
(1999). 
11 Levinson, “Film Music and Narrative Agency,” p. 256. Here, and in the following 
quotations, we can substitute something like “epistemically accessible” for “visible,” and 
“epistemic access” for “perceptual access.” 
12 Ibid., p. 252. 
13 Ibid., pp. 252-3. 
14 Wilson, “Le Grand Imagier,” p. 309. 
15 Gregory Currie is too quick to suppose literature can be well-founded. He says that 




certain events witnessed or otherwise known about by someone, who then went to the 
trouble of setting it all down for us in writing....” (Gregory Currie, Image and Mind: 
Film, Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
p. 266). But it does not take long to come up with intractable questions, such as how 
someone got to know these things, why they write so well, why they give their account 
such a literary structure, etc. 
16 David Hills in correspondence with George Wilson, cited in Wilson, “Le Grand 
Imagier,” p. 317, n. 28. 
17 Wilson, “Le Grand Imagier,” p. 309. 
18 Chatman, Coming to Terms, p. 130.  
19 Currie, Image and Mind, pp. 265-8. 
20 In Wilson’s sense, discussed above. 
21 See John Barth, The Floating Opera and The End of the Road (New York: Doubleday, 
1988 [originally published 1956 and 1958]), pp. 333 & 427-8, and his LETTERS: a novel 
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1979), p. 339. Perhaps embarrassed by his pre-
postmodern virtuosity in founding this fiction, in his later novel, LETTERS (1979), Barth 
complicates things by putting (a version of) himself in the fictional world and writing to 
Horner, apologizing for the coincidences between the earlier novel and Horner’s life. He 
describes to Horner how he might have simply found just such a manuscript. Horner is 
distinctly nonplussed, replying that he finds the new foundation “less convincing than the 
novel itself” (LETTERS, p. 279). 




23 Graham Greene, The Heart of the Matter (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978 [originally 
published 1948]), p. 11. 
24 Ibid., p. 7. 
25 If there isn’t a Monty Python sketch like this, there should be.  
26 As Deborah Knight was quick to remind me, Greene also excels at fictional first-
person narration. 
27 See the next section for my dissolution of this problem. 
28 Private communication. 
29 Ibid. 
30 I dub mine a “minimal theory” after Paisley Livingston’s “minimalist position,” 
outlined in “Narration, Narrators, and Fictional Presentations”. I come to similar 
conclusions by a different route. The main differences between our positions are that 
Livingston argues (1) that some narratives may have no narrator at all, because (2) our 
acquiescence in the indeterminacy of the foundations of fictions could be extended to the 
question of whether there is a narrator; that is, the question is not necessarily an 
answerable or even appropriate one. 
31 Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1972), pp. 42-50. 
32 Perhaps more so, since fictional worlds are arguably subject to fewer constraints than 
possible worlds. 




34 Levinson, “Film Music and Narrative Agency,” p. 279, n. 11; Kendall Walton, Mimesis 
as Make-Believe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 368-72. 
35 Clearly my views about these particular works are defeasible without weakening my 
general theory. 
36 For the importance of intentional explanations, see Gregory Currie, “Interpretation and 
Objectivity,” Mind 102 (1993): 413-28, and Image and Mind, chapter 8. Wilson applies 
similar considerations to film fictions in Narration in Light, pp. 142-3. 
37 Notice that Thackeray cannot be an unreliable narrator for the Kripkean reasons 
mentioned above. The actual author constitutes the fictional world by his narration; the 
fictional world of Vanity Fair had no existence, prior to Thackeray’s telling, against 
which his reliability could be judged. 
38 In his earlier work, Wilson seems to suggest this for literary fiction, while 
recommending a more cautious approach, something like my minimal theory, for film 
fictions. See Narration in Light, pp. 134, 136-7. 
39 There is no space to consider these issues in any depth here, but I hope to address them 
in the future. 
 
I would like to thank the following for useful discussion of this topic: Jerrold Levinson, 
Paisley Livingston, Robert Stecker, the editor and an anonymous referee of this journal, 
and the participants in the 2002 NEH Summer Institute: Art, Mind, and Cognitive 
Science. I presented a version of this paper at a session of the 2002 ASA Annual 




audience. I would also like to thank the ASA and the Cosmos Club Foundation for grants 
enabling me to attend that meeting. 
